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Boulevard to broken dreams, Part 1:  
the Polonoroeste road project in the  
Brazilian amazon, and the World Bank’s 
environmental and indigenous peoples’ norms
O projeto de estrada Polonoroeste na Amazônia brasileira, e as 
normas ambientais e dos povos indígenas do Banco Mundial
roBerT h. Wade*
RESUMO: O projeto de estrada Polonoroeste na Amazônia brasileira, e as normas 
ambientais e dos povos indígenas do Banco Mundial. Ao final de 1980 o Banco incorporou 
as normas de sustentabilidade ambiental e proteção dos povos indígenas e foi seguido 
por outras organizações interestaduais orientadas para o desenvolvimento. Este artigo de 
duas partes descreve como uma luta sobre o projeto da estrada Polonoroeste na Amazônia 
brasileira – dentro do banco, entre o Banco e ONgs apoiadas pelo Congresso dos EUA, e 
entre o Banco e o governo do Brasil –ajudou na mudança de normas políticas de longo 
alcance. A primeira parte descreve como o projeto foi concebido como uma inovação no 
desenvolvimento sustentável em florestas tropicais; e como ela provocou um alvoroço 
dentro do Banco enquanto se movia em direção a aprovação do projeto.
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ABSTRACT: Before the mid 1980s the World Bank conceived “nature” as something to be 
“conquered” and “environment” as a source of resources for “development”. By the late 
1980s the Bank incorporated norms of environmental sustainability and indigenous peoples’ 
protection into its mandate, and other development-oriented IOs followed. This two-part 
paper describes how a fight over the Polonoroeste road project in the Brazilian Amazon – 
inside the Bank, between the Bank and NgOs supported by the US Congress, and between 
the Bank and the government of Brazil –helped to generate the far-reaching change of policy 
norms. The first part describes how the project was designed as an innovation in sustainable 
development in rainforests; and how it provoked a firestorm inside the Bank as it moved 
towards project approval.
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INTROdUCTION1
Inter-state organizations (IOs) are steered by policy norms –shared expecta-
tions of all relevant actors about what constitutes appropriate policy prescription 
for a particular sector. In any sector there are many potential norms about appro-
priate policies (for forests, indigenous peoples, management of the capital account, 
tax structure, gender); but IOs have an inner imperative to crystallize out only one 
set of norms and codify that set in policy documents and operational procedures. 
Once this codification is achieved the norm starts to exert “structural power” on 
the behaviour of IOs and on international policy more generally. But most of the 
International Relations literature which emphasises the structural power of norms 
to shape action takes the existence of norms as the starting point, and says little 
about the process by which the norms emerge and then stabilize (and later perhaps 
decline, in a norm cycle). 
The literature tends to imply a linear path of cumulative learning, from igno-
rance towards knowledge, and to ignore the fights over differing norms. For ex-
ample, the magisterial history of the World Bank by Edward Mason and Robert 
Asher says next to nothing about fights over norms and policies; it describes only 
the end results.2 
This essay explains the emergence of norms about environmental protection 
and indigenous peoples’ protection in the World Bank. Before the mid to late 1980s 
the Bank conceived “nature” as something to be “conquered”, and “environment” 
as a source of “resources” for “development”. Protection of the environment (be-
yond what was required for good engineering practice or good agronomy) was for 
the United Nations Environment Program or someone else to take care of. 
Protection of indigenous peoples was for the borrower government. Once the Bank 
incorporated norms of environmental sustainability and indigenous peoples protec-
tion into its own mandate in the late 1980s, other development-oriented IOs fol-
lowed. The Bank was the first mover.
Political scientists writing about the emergence of environmental norms in the 
World Bank have emphasised the role of external agents in forcing the Bank to 
change its mind, especially US NgOs. The latter took ideas already codified for the 
United States, and used their access to Congress to get it to use its control of US 
financing for the Bank as a lever. As Susan Park says, “In terms of the World Bank’s 
1 This article is based on field work inside the World Bank in 1995-96 for the World Bank History 
Project. It is an extended version of Wade’s account of Polonoroeste in “greening the Bank: the struggle 
over the environment, 1970-1995”, in devesh Kapur, John Lewis and Richard Webb (eds), 1997, The 
World Bank: Its First Half Century, Brookings, vol. 2. Maritta Koch-Weser provided useful comments 
on an earlier draft. 
2 Mason, Edward and Robert Asher, (1973), The World Bank Since Bretton Woods. Washington dC: 
Brookings.
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environmental actions, it is well documented that external pressure has overwhelm-
ingly, although not exclusively, influenced the Bank…. The idea of protecting the 
natural environment emerged within the World Bank in the 1980s with the ‘do no 
harm’ principle after [external] environmentalists documented large-scale, high-
profile, environmentally disastrous Bank projects”. 3 
It is true that from the mid 1980s onwards environmental NgOs launched 
campaigns against the World Bank and some of its borrower governments. They 
selected particular projects for scrutiny, aiming to reveal publicly that the projects 
were having damaging effects not admitted by the Bank, and thereby convince the 
Bank’s shareholders that the organization needed institutional reform. The NgOs 
were mostly American, and they worked through public media and the US Congress 
to force the Bank to change its norms and procedures. 
However, this version of the history underplays the internal organizational 
structure of the Bank, the internal debates over appropriate environmental and 
social ideas, and the way that internal norm advocates frustrated by internal ob-
stacles gave the external advocates information (oxygen). This is particularly true 
of Polonoroeste (“Northwest Pole”), in northwest Brazil, the first project to attract 
serious criticism of the Bank from the US government, US NgOs, and the US pub-
lic. Polonoeste was a point of transition for the whole of the Bank, after which 
senior managers came to agree that the organization had to change some of its key 
ideas, structure and procedures. 
The Polonoroeste project aimed to pave an existing 1,500 kilometer dirt road 
from the densely populated south central region into the sparsely populated 
Amazon, in the states of Mato grasso and later Rondonia. The planners justified 
the road in terms of assisting already settled families in this part of Amazonia and 
helping establish new arrivals in farms and settlements, while also keeping them 
out of (to be) demarcated ecological and Amerindian zones. The affected area was 
the size of Ecuador, California, or great Britain. The Bank approved five loans in 
support of Polonoroeste between 1981 and 1983, totaling $457 million. Well over 
half went for the highway and feeder roads. The Bank was the only non-Brazilian 
source of finance.4 
The Northwest Region Integrated development Program, to give its full 
English name, was conceived in the Bank not as a routine project but as game-
changer. The project team designed it as a project that would give unprecedented 
attention to mitigating adverse effects on the environment and on indigenous peo-
ples  Whereas the Brazilian government was mainly interested in Bank help with 
3 Susan Park (2010) “The World Bank’s global safeguard policy norm?”, in Susan Park and Antje 
Vetterlein, Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank, Cambridge 
University Press, at 182, 183-4, emphasis added. 
4 World Bank, “World Bank Approaches to the Environment in Brazil”, vol. V, “The Polonoroeste 
Program”, OEd Report 10039, SecM92-64, April 30, 1992. 
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the highway (on which construction had been started earlier by the military), the 
Bank wanted to use its money to induce the government to agree to a model of 
comprehensive, sustainable regional development in rainforest areas, which could 
be applied in other parts of the world. 
The irony is rich. Starting in 1983 and continuing till 1987 US NgOs used 
Polonoroeste as their trampoline for demanding changes in Bank policy. In a cre-
scendo of articles, television documentaries and hearings before US congressional 
committees, the Bank’s environmental critics held up Polonoroeste as “the Bank’s 
biggest ... and most disastrous involvement in forest colonization in the tropics”, the 
quintessential example of its pursuit of misguided development strategies.5 
Polonoroeste offered powerful images of palls of smoke, bulldozed trees, blackened 
stumps. It presented a saga of victims and villains, of immiserized peasants and 
state-of-nature Amerindians squashed by military governments, rapacious loggers, 
and multilateral banks. The Sierra Club’s indictment of the World Bank and other 
multilateral development banks, called Bankrolling Disasters, featured on its cover 
a color photograph of a newly cleared forest in Polonoroeste, with the caption, “A 
typical scene of destruction as development advances in the Amazon”.6 The British 
journal The Ecologist, whose brand of political ecology carried a strong critique of 
existing development models, published a special issue called The World Bank: 
Global Financing of Impoverishment and Famine, with articles on Polonoroeste.7 
Sixty Minutes, the most widely watched US television newsweekly at the time, fea-
tured Polonoroeste in a 1987 documentary sharply critical of the World Bank for 
wasting US taxpayers’ dollars. For periods after these and other denunciations ap-
peared, dozens, sometimes hundreds of protest letters arrived at the Bank president’s 
office every day. Chain-sawed tree trunks and displaced Amerindians became post-
er-children of the environmental movement. Many people who had never heard of 
the World Bank came to know it as “the bank that destroys rainforests”. 
Suddenly the Bank found itself defined as doer of harm and teller of lies, and 
required to react to outsiders’ ideas about how it should do its business. For an 
organization that had always prided itself on its service to humanity and unrivalled 
technical expertise, this was bewildering. 
When Barber Conable, the president of the Bank, announced a major expan-
sion of the Bank’s environmental capacity in 1987 he gave special attention to 
Polonoroeste. It was, he said, 
5 Bruce Rich (1985) “Multi-lateral development banks. Their role in destroying the global environment”, 
The Ecologist, vol. 15, no. 1/2, p. 59.
6 Sierra Club, Bankrolling Disasters: International Development Banks and the Global Environment, 
Washington dC: Sierra Club, 1986.
7 The Ecologist, “The World Bank: global Financing of Impoverishment and Famine”, vol. 15, no. 1/2 
(1985).
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“a sobering example of an environmentally sound effort which went 
wrong. The Bank misread the human, institutional and physical realities 
of the jungle and the frontier. In some cases, the dynamics of the frontier 
got out of control. Protective measures to shelter fragile land and tribal 
people were included; they were not, however, carefully timed or ade-
quately monitored”.8
“The Bank misread…the realities”, said Conable. But who is the Bank? Long 
before environmental NgOs began to focus on it the project had become contro-
versial inside the Bank. The NgOs took it as their spearhead partly because a few 
of the project’s internal critics brought it to their attention and gave them informa-
tion. From the beginning some staff argued that the Bank should stay away from 
the project because the risks were too high and better alternatives for agricultural 
development existed elsewhere in the northern part of Brazil. The internal disputes 
gave rise to what one participant called “a turbulent and traumatic evolution dur-
ing its preparatory phases”, referring to “the many controversies that marked its 
slow progress through the Bank”.9 
The Bank eventually suspended financial disbursements for the project in re-
sponse to the NgO campaign and the evidence of environmental and social damage 
the campaign forced the Bank to recognize – the first time in the Bank’s history that 
it had suspended disbursements on such grounds. It resumed disbursements only 
after it was satisfied that the Brazilian government had made at least some progress 
on its commitments. 
Hence the Polonoroeste project has a seminal role in the history of how the 
Bank moved from saying that development and environment are two different fields, 
to saying “Our mandate is economic growth, poverty reduction and environmen-
tally and socially sustainable development”; and also a seminal role in the interwo-
ven politics of how it moved from saying “We are accountable only to our share-
holders (member governments), and NgOs can convey their views to us only 
through the relevant Executive director on the Board” to saying “We are concerned 
to reach out to civil society organizations and learn from what they have to say”. 
This essay describes the project’s “turbulent and traumatic evolution” inside 
the Bank, highlighting relationships between (a) the operational staff with direct 
project responsibility, located in the regional vice presidencies, (b) the technical 
experts located in the Central Projects Staff (the “curia” for the operational divi-
sions), and (c) the senior management. Through these relationships one sees how 
the organization was addressing “green” issues and “social” issues before it had 
dedicated staff, organizational units, and operational procedures to address them. 
8 Barber Conable, speech to World Resources Institute, May, 1987. 
9 James Lee (PASEN) to Mr V. Rajagopalan, director, PAS, August 4, 1983. 
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Long before the Bank established formal regional environmental divisions and 
a central environment department in 1987, technical experts in the center were 
pressing environmental and social issues. But when project leaders in the regional 
vice presidency, backed by senior management, were determined to get the project 
approved by the Board and dispersing funds (getting projects approved by the 
Board was the metric of project staff’s career success), the technical advice could 
be largely ignored if it would slow down the project or raise costs. The technical 
experts in the central complex saw themselves having to deal with the regional 
project staff sometimes as diplomats and sometimes as guerrillas. 
Adding to the thin body of literature on how development-oriented IOs work 
on the inside, the essay illustrates intra-Bank and Bank-country interactions at the 
“emerging” stage of norm formation, before the relevant norms stabilize and acquire 
formal validity in the form of policy papers and operational directives. From the 
events described here came an elaborate set of formal norms by the late 1990s, in 
the shape of “safeguard policies” covering environment, indigenous peoples, re-
settlement and other domains, which had in common that the Bank was exposed 
to high reputational risk in all of them. 
FIRST STEPS
In 1900, over 80 percent of Brazilians lived near the sea—“crabs clinging to 
the coast”, as they were once described. The population and economy have been 
drifting towards the interior ever since, especially after the relocation of the capital 
to Brasilia in 1960, in central Brazil. By the late 1960s the Brazilian state expanded 
strategically into Amazonia, initially by building the Transamazonia East-West 
Highway and associated resettlements. 
By the early 1970s the military was building a gravel road (Highway 364) 
into the northwest Amazon. The fast economic growth of the late 1960s and early 
1970s–when Brazil was the “economic miracle”–fuelled a nationalist mood that 
prioritized integrating unoccupied areas and their purported natural wealth with 
the rest of the country, lest they be cannibalized by foreign enterprises or foreign 
governments. In 1970 the country’s military rulers announced a “plan for national 
integration” that involved the planned settlement of Rondonia. A key part of the 
plan called for as many as five million peasants to be settled on tracts of virgin 
Amazon soil by 1989, making it potentially the most ambitious colonization effort 
undertaken in the Americas since the opening of the American West a century be-
fore. The World Bank was not asked to participate, because the military government 
regarded the plan as a matter of national security which foreigners should not be 
involved in.
Transport along the unpaved road remained difficult, and during the rainy 
season almost impossible. Promised support to the new settlers did not materialize. 
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Most of the pilot colonization settlements failed. With a change of government in 
1974 the organized settlement program was abandoned, while unorganized settle-
ment continued. By 1979 newspaper reports on the plight of the stranded settlers 
from the 1970-74 scheme were describing Rondonia as “a land of absolute and 
total desperation”. A Washington Post story in 1979 said, “elected officials, church 
leaders and technicians here charge that Brazil’s Amazon’s pioneers are victims not 
so much of the frontier’s inevitable ruggedness as the Brazilian government’s lack 
of planning and the constant zig-zags in its Amazon development policy”.10
The new Brazilian government of the late 1970s wished to resuscitate the 
project. It saw Polonoroeste as a way to achieve several national security and eco-
nomic goals at once: to fill up the “demographic desert” of the Amazon with 
Brazilian citizens so as to consolidate its territorial jurisdiction; create a new source 
of foreign exchange earnings from tree crops; and reduce unemployment and pres-
sure on land elsewhere in Brazil. Unemployment and land pressure were related to 
Brazil’s extremely unequal income distribution. The government, reflecting elite 
interests in the wealthy south, promoted a shift from small-scale peasant agriculture 
to large-scale export production. It gave generous tax and credit subsidies for land 
clearing, cattle breeding and labor-replacing mechanization. It saw the Amazon 
frontier as a conflict-reducing vent for the resulting displaced population.
Unlike many Bank projects this one was initiated by the borrower: the govern-
ment sought out the Bank. The Brazilians were already receiving large Bank loans 
for the maintenance and rehabilitation of existing highways, and they wanted 
Polonoroeste to be just another road rehabilitation project. The Bank responded 
positively, and the Latin America Highways division sent out a project preparation 
mission in 1978. The mission found that migrants by the truckload were arriving 
every day—only to fall into a poverty trap, unable to buy inputs or market outputs 
because of the poor state of the roads, said the Brazilians and the Bank. 
But the Bank staff saw the need for more than roads. They argued that, (1) 
Brazil would pave the highway and build the feeder roads whether the Bank helped 
or not; (2) with the highway made into an all-weather road still more migrants 
would flood in; (3) the Brazilian government was engaged in planning settlements 
on the basis of geometrical grids that ignored soils, water, and slope, with results 
repeating the 1970-74 failure; so (4) Bank help in preparing a wider regional de-
velopment scheme would ensure that more was done on the ground to make the 
settlements viable and to protect the environment and Indians. From this perspec-
tive the Bank saw the road project as the entry price for a complex regional inte-
grated rural development program. The Bank was by then, around 1980, promoting 
integrated rural development (IRd) projects all over the world. IRd was the fash-
ion. IRd could be applied in the Amazon, said the Bank. 
10 Larry Rohter, “Hopes of Amazon pioneers dashed in nightmare of misery”, Washington Post, January 
28, 1979, p. A 24-25.
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy  36 (1), 2016 • pp. 214-230
221
Processing the highway loan was suspended for a year while the Bank sent out 
a further fact-finding mission in late 1979. The mission’s report of 1980 concluded 
that the region did have big agricultural potential and that the rate of return to the 
project investment would be very high. It also concluded that careful steps had to 
be taken to mitigate environmental and social costs–including malaria, deforesta-
tion, extinction of species, and the impoverishment or death of the Amerindian 
inhabitants, whose numbers were estimated, at first, at 5,000. 
The steps for mitigating environmental damage included (1) land-use zoning, 
(2) the development of cropping patterns and practices thought suitable to the 
fragile and variegated soils, (3) the demarcation and gazetting of reserves, and (4) 
detailed soil mapping, to steer the migrants away from areas of low agricultural 
potential. These same steps would help protect the Amerindian populations; but 
there was also a special program for Amerindian protection, including the creation 
of special reserves, special health care and related measures called for in Brazil’s 
existing legislation on indigenous people but not enforced. 
One geographical feature guaranteed that the venture would be difficult. The 
markets for the bulk of the agricultural produce were in the south at the start of 
the highway, while the patches of good soils were mostly in the north at the far end 
of the highway. The long tract in between was thought to have mostly poor soils, 
unsuitable to sustained annual cropping but perhaps suitable for tree crops. yet the 
migrants would probably not wait till they got to the good northern soils; they 
would head for land closer to the start, burn the forests and—not having enough 
savings to invest in tree crops—plant annual crops. If the soils could not support 
annual crops, the migrants would move to another place, chop down more forest 
and start again. Without enforced zoning, deforestation and immiseration of the 
forest-dwelling Amerindians would result. 
PROJECT PREPARATION 
The project had a powerful champion in the Bank who saw Polonoroeste as a 
model for the development of “the world’s last land frontier” and also as his own 
contribution to history. Robert Skillings, chief of the Brazil country programs divi-
sion from 1971 to late 1982, had joined the Bank in 1947, by the time of his retire-
ment in the late 1980s being the longest-serving Bank staff member ever. He was 
then one of the highest profile division chiefs in the Bank, with a reputation as “a 
complex character, an extremely forceful personality, someone who struck fear 
into the hearts of subordinates”, in the words of a colleague. By the late 1970s the 
Amazon was his passion. during a sabbatical year in 1978/79 at the nearby Johns 
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington dC he spent 
much of the time researching and teaching about the Amazon, visiting the region 
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several times and co-authoring a book about it.11 Market exploitation of the 
Amazon was inevitable, he said; the only question was whether it happened wisely 
or in the free-for-all anarchy of the American West. The Bank could help to ensure 
that this global asset was developed wisely. 
From the start Skillings took the project as his own, notwithstanding that he 
was division chief in the programs hierarchy of the Latin American vice presidency, 
not the projects hierarchy. It was unusual for a programs division chief to take this 
kind of role in a project. At the top, President McNamara signaled keen support 
for Skillings and the project. He wanted the Bank to do more to reduce poverty in 
Northeast and Northwest Brazil. He also loved complex, integrated projects that 
promised heroic transformation. 
The fact finding mission of late 1979 comprised nine people. The members 
disagreed about what the Bank should do. Robert goodland, a tropical ecologist 
in the Bank’s tiny Office of Environmental Affairs, argued that the risks of jungle 
settlement were simply too high. The Bank should rather focus on the development 
of the savannah (cerrado) of central Brazil, an area nearly as big as the Amazon, 
relatively empty of people, whose development would not involve cutting tropical 
forests and exposing fragile soils, whose climate was more suitable to agriculture, 
and whose location was closer to major markets. He had done extensive field re-
search in both the Amazon and the savannah before joining the Bank, so he had 
expert knowledge.12 After the fact finding mission he was not invited near the 
project again.
Other members of the mission, especially the transport economist, urged the 
Bank to go slow on the highway project for a year or two while efforts were made 
to help the Brazilians do some of the foundations for the agriculture, environment, 
Amerindian and health components–to do proper soil and cadastral surveys, for a 
start. 
On the reconnaissance mission they realized, as they had not before, that the 
road would go through the lands of vulnerable Amerindian tribes. The mission 
leader brought up the issue with Brazilian officials. The result was a shouting match. 
“There is no way the Bank will be involved in Amerindian protection”, said the 
Brazilians. They regarded Amerindian protection as a national security issue, no 
more appropriate for the Bank than it would be for the Brazilian government to 
tell the US Federal Bureau of Investigation how to do its business.
Skillings joined the mission for a debriefing session at the end. Around a hotel 
dinner table he asked each member to state their conclusions about the project. 
11 Robert Skillings and Nils Tcheyan, 1979, Economic Development Prospects of the Amazon Region 
of Brazil, Washington dC: Center for Brazil Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, The 
Johns Hopkins University. 
12 R. goodland and M.g. Ferri, Ecologia do Cerrado, São Paulo: University of São Paulo Press, 1979, 
and R. goodland, The Amazon Jungle: Green Hell to Red Desert, Elsevier Academic, 1975.
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Most urged either that the Bank stay out or that the road component be delayed 
while the other things were started. Skillings was angry. yes, he said, the project 
was risky, but it would be worse if the Bank were not involved. A decision not to 
get involved would anger the Brazilian government and his own senior manage-
ment, both of which were expecting the project. He declared that the project would 
proceed. The government was not interested in borrowing for an altered sequence, 
he said, and in any case agricultural improvement without the road–without good 
access to markets–was infeasible. The mission report misrepresented Skillings’ 
views as the mission’s consensus.
The work of project preparation was divided into three components, one for 
roads, one for agriculture, one for health. The road and health components were 
carried out quite separately, little connected to each other or to the agriculture 
component. Together the project staff spanned five divisions. There was no overall 
project leader in a substantive sense (only a loan officer who provided administra-
tive coordination). Skillings came as near to playing the role of project leader as 
anyone, but he had the whole of the Bank’s dealings with Brazil to manage. 
The agriculture component included the agricultural settlements and the eco-
logical and Amerindian reserves. Five people spread across three sector divisions, 
one of them half time, worked on the agriculture component. They were mostly 
idealistic and young (late 20s and early 30s). They regarded themselves as innova-
tors, charged with taking the Bank into the unknown territory of environmental 
protection, indigenous people’s protection, and appropriate agricultural methods 
in tropical rainforests  They had lively debates among themselves. 
Much of the technical work on the agricultural side was done by people in the 
World Bank-FAO Cooperative Program, based at FAO headquarters in Rome. 
Between 1979 and mid-1981 the World Bank-FAO Cooperative Program sent out 
ten missions to help prepare the three agricultural sub-projects, each mission of 
three to four people lasting about three weeks. One even included a butterfly spe-
cialist. There was certainly no skimping on technical input into project design. The 
job of these people was to show what could be done, technically, assuming a well-
ordered world with bona fide government officials. 
Early on Skillings did make an attempt to involve an outside expert in the 
Amerindian protection component. This was david Maybury-Lewis, professor of 
anthropology at Harvard and president of Survival International. Maybury-Lewis 
recommended the Bank employ the anthropologist david Price as consultant, who 
had worked extensively in the area. At the end of his employment Price broke 
confidentiality agreements and went public with savage criticisms of the Bank.13 
This, together with the Brazilian government’s attitude, confirmed Skillings in his 
13 david Price, Before the Bulldozers: The Nambiquara Indians and the World Bank, Washington dC: 
Seven Locks Press, 1989. 
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conviction that the Bank should stay away from NgOs and other so-called experts, 
and away from Amerindian protection. 
Hence the project leaders strongly discouraged the staff from having even in-
formal contact with non-governmental groups knowledgeable about the Amazon, 
in Brazil or in the US. Later, Maritta Koch-Weser, at the beginning of her work on 
the Amerindian protection component, arranged for a meeting with NgOs and the 
Church. But the NgOs treated her, representing the Bank, as devil Incarnate, and 
scripted newspaper articles to the effect that the Bank was trying to “co-opt” the 
NgO community. Meanwhile, Skillings was furious at her for having made the 
contact at all. 
By and large, the Bank’s knowledge about the situation came from a small 
number of people located in the Bank, in FAO, and in the Brazilian government. It 
undertook no analysis of the politics of the region and no analysis of the capabili-
ties of the public agencies on the ground. 
THE INTERNAL VORTEX 
As project preparation proceeded Polonoroeste was boosted as one of the 
Bank’s flagship projects. But many Bank officials expressed worries. Robert 
goodland, who rang the alarm bell on the first reconnaissance mission, was not 
invited back but nevertheless followed it closely from the sidelines. The transport 
economist, responsible for the economic analysis of the highway, continued to urge 
that the Bank not go ahead with the highway until more of the other things were 
in place; and said that rail and river transport alternatives should be examined too. 
At project appraisal he made this argument forcibly and was kicked off the team, 
then dispatched to one of the Bank’s dumping grounds, the Operations Evaluation 
department. Skillings had his contribution to world history to protect, all the more 
so because he was approaching retirement.
Other critics in the central Office of Environmental Affairs and the central 
Agriculture and Rural development department continued to speak out. James Lee, 
the Bank’s environmental advisor, reported in a January 1980 memo to his director, 
“Any Amazon basin development is likely to be closely scrutinized and we feel the 
Bank would be open to severe criticism, unless great care were exercised in project 
formulation and implementation to avoid serious environmental repercussions. We 
feel that the currently used agricultural production system in land settlement and 
development areas do not offer a sustainable livelihood for farmers and settlers on 
any but the best `terra roxa’ soils....[The other alternatives proposed are all un-
proven.] To use unproven technologies as a basis for agricultural settlement under 
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extremely adverse soil conditions would be a highly risky undertaking and could 
prove disastrous for the settlers themselves.”14 
Lee’s memo emphasised the thinness of knowledge about soils in the area. 
Indeed, the only soil data came from the results of a brief and unsystematic FAO 
survey some years before. The project team did not plan to get more, partly because 
it would take too long. 
Senior people in the powerful Agriculture and Rural development department, 
in the central complex, added their warnings. In early 1980 one said that the proj-
ect’s harmful effects would include “deforestation, particularly of lands unsuitable 
for sustained agriculture, use of unsustainable agricultural production systems, and 
the invasion of tribal reservations”. Even if the Bank limited its financial support 
to the rehabilitation of existing settlements [this was one option being considered], 
it would be seen as supporting the total program. “In such a case we, along with 
the Brazilian government, might be considered responsible for allowing indigenous 
people in the area to be deprived of their lands, exposed to fatal epidemics, and to 
be socially, morally and culturally degraded....I suspect that the government’s un-
willingness to have the Bank involved in any ‘Amerindian’ programs or contacts is 
a portent of what may be in store!”.15 
yet a well-advanced project report, July 1980, retained the earlier optimism 
about agricultural potential. Reviewing the report, Bank agricultural experts in the 
Agriculture and Rural development department reiterated their earlier warnings. 
Said one, “Very little is known about the land capacity, ground surveys having been 
limited to areas of relatively easy access....The scarcity of information is well re-
flected in the fact that discussion of the basic resource for any agricultural develop-
ment–the soils and land capability–is limited to a half a page, together with [a table]”. 
The reviewer of the green Cover project report went on to observe that “the 
problem of enforcement is neglected. This seems to be a crucial issue. If the ex-
pected large influx of settlers occurs, can they all–or at least a very large propor-
tion–be guided to settle lands which are capable of sustained productivity? How 
will settlement of other lands be avoided short of using a large armed policing 
force? If settlers on unsuitable sites and in forest reserves are to be evicted and 
given priority for alternative holdings, this could be an incentive to settle such areas 
as a means of getting on a priority list.” He concluded, “The tone of overall opti-
mism does not seem warranted....it seems far from certain, at present, that the 
Northwest Region will either prove capable of sustaining any very significant vo-
lume of exports out of the region, or providing a sustained livelihood for the an-
14 James Lee (OEA) to V. Rajagopalan (CPSVP), January 8, 1980, emphases added. 
15 J.C. Collins (AgR/CPS) to R. goodland (PAS), February 25, 1980, emphasis added.
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ticipated large number of poor settlers without requiring a large and continuing 
Government subsidy.”16 
Meanwhile, one of the main champions of the project himself concluded from 
a mission to examine the capabilities of the Amerindian protection agency on which 
the Bank was relying to implement key safeguards, “FUNAI is presently a weak 
institution, demoralized by the ongoing dissension between administrators and 
technical staff. This conclusion is more or less universally accepted in Brazil, as is 
the feeling that a thorough restructuring of FUNAI is urgently needed. Such a re-
structuring... will be a long-term proposition and, thus, the Bank should be pre-
pared to accept considerable risk in the interim if it decides to continue its associa-
tion with FUNAI”.17
A soil and agricultural production specialist wrote a withering critique of the 
project report, especially its near total neglect of soil quality and drainage. He 
concluded: “In my view, the investigation of lands is presently inadequate to jus-
tify the Program”.18 
In short, the internal critics said the decision to go ahead would reflect an in-
adequate knowledge of soils, an underestimation of the environmental and social 
risks, and an overestimation of the willingness and ability of government agencies 
to implement their commitments. They also said there were better opportunities 
for Bank involvement elsewhere in northern Brazil. Experts from the World Bank-
FAO Cooperative Program in Rome tended to agree. Indeed they were the source 
of some of the information that the internal critics kept putting to Skillings. 
LOAN APPROVAL, 1981
In the face of persistent criticisms of the project from the Central Projects Staff, 
Brazil Programs division Chief Skillings remained unmoved. At a meeting with a 
few of the critics in November 1980, “Mr Skillings was of the opinion that the 
Bank’s presence in the proposed development scheme was important to obtaining 
consideration of the environmental and tribal peoples issues. He admitted that it 
was not likely that all the recommendations made with regard to both issues would 
be implemented, but felt that even partial consideration and implementation were 
sufficient to warrant the Bank’s participation”.19 
Much of what the Bank was doing, he said, was simply to get the Brazilian 
16 J.C. Collins (Advisor, Irrigated Field Crops, AgR/CPS) to d. Mahar (Economist, LC2), July 9, 1980, 
first emphasis added, second (“given priority...”) emphasis in original, third added.
17 dennis Mahar (Economist, LC2dA) to Robert Skillings, division Chief, LC2dA, July 7, 1980. 
18 W.B. Peters to J.C. Collins, AgR, dated July 21, 1981.
19 James Lee, to Files, November 25, 1980. 
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government to follow its own legislation on the protection of peoples and areas 
adversely affected by development projects, in a political situation in which no 
powerful interests within Brazil wished the legislation to be enforced. He related 
how at a meeting with the head of the main coordinating body for Polonoroeste 
within the Brazilian government he had tried to bring up the need for Amerindian 
safeguards. As he spoke the head of the coordinating agency had reared back in his 
chair, clasped his hands over his ears, and said, “Please, please, don’t bring up 
Indians”. The Bank’s involvement in the protection of Indians would just invite 
trouble from the array of Brazilian interests that had no wish to protect them, said 
the official. 
Indeed, at a later meeting, Skillings himself distanced the Bank from Indian 
protection. “The World Bank was above all else an economic development institu-
tion and should not align itself with or `take up’ a cause such as the [tribal peoples’ 
issue]. He cited drugs, urban crime, etc., as causes which could also merit the Bank’s 
attention.”20
In April 1981 the Loan Committee (of the operational vice presidents) met to 
discuss the decision to proceed to negotiations with the Brazilians (about phase I, 
the biggest component of the three phase program). This was the last point in the 
process where the project could, in practice, be turned back or modified; once ap-
proved for negotiations the project was very likely to be approved by the Board. 
The representatives from the Latin America region (not the central departments 
which had been the seat of opposition) “explained that existing information con-
firms that adequate soils and appropriate cultivation techniques are available for 
agricultural development of the Northwest Region”.21 They also said that the Bank 
could be reasonably confident that the new settlements would be confined to areas 
with soils that could support them, because “areas of unsuitable soils have in the 
past normally been shunned even by spontaneous migrants”.
The minutes record that members of the Central Projects Staff “expressed 
concern” that, “in the absence of land use planning and enforcement”, unsuitable 
soil areas would “increasingly be invaded for shifting cultivation of food crops 
leading to rapid environmental degradation”. But the central Agriculture and Rural 
development (AgR) department had already signed off on the project, fundamen-
tal objections notwithstanding. By this time the project had too much momentum 
behind it for it to be redesigned, especially given McNamara’s and Skillings’ com-
mitment. And the project statement had indeed been modified to take partial ac-
count of AgR concerns. The text said more forcefully than before that the sites of 
new settlement would only be in areas of good soil–but left unanswered the AgR 
20 James Lee, to Files, december 19, 1980, emphasis added.
21 Loan Committee minutes of meeting to consider the Northwest Region development Program and 
First Stage Project held on April 15, 1981, dated May 7, 1981, all emphases added, here and in the later 
quotes.
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points that (1) no one knew where the good soils were, and (2) no enforcement 
mechanism existed to channel people towards them. 
On the issue of Indian protection Ernest Stern, the chairman of the meeting 
and the senior operational vice president (number two in the Bank after McNamara), 
“inquired whether any participant in the meeting felt that the Bank was not doing 
anything it should be doing. The general view”, the minutes continue, “was that 
the proposed measures were satisfactory but that close monitoring of their imple-
mentation would be required, especially given the fact that the issue was contro-
versial and that the Bank would undoubtedly continue to be subject to criticism.”
The environmental advisor suggested that the Bank should meet with outside 
critics of the project “in order to fully share facts and views on the steps being 
taken...to protect the interests of the Amerindian population, in an effort to defuse 
what is a highly charged emotional issue”. The Latin American region said no. “The 
Region observed that some of the positive results obtained on this matter were 
made possible by the atmosphere of mutual confidence that prevailed in our discus-
sions of the matter with the Government, and     caution was required in making 
public the results of these discussions.” In reply, “the Environmental Advisor said 
that the critics could be expected to take their case to the governments of several 
of the Bank’s important donor countries”. This was an early warning of what was 
to come. 
Stern proposed that the region should respond to the critics by placing an 
article on the whole program, including the Indian issue, in Finance and 
Development (the Bank/Fund quarterly); and arrange “appropriate discussions on 
the topic with the members of the Board [not outside critics] in due course”. A 
modest proposal. 
during the meeting Stern several times raised the question of whether the 
Brazilian federal and state government had the capacity to carry out the plans. 
“Shouldn’t we wait till we have better data about soils?”, his assistant asked the 
project staff. Answer: “We have put in a provision for agro zoning to be done before 
the road reaches that point”. “What happens if the road gets there first?”. Answer: 
“That won’t happen”. 
Late in the one and a half hour meeting a vice president asked for the floor, 
leaned back in his chair, folded his arms, and said, “What we are really saying is, 
`The government of Brazil is willing to sign its name to a legal contract that it will 
undertake certain obligations. do we believe it, or do we not? If all the provisions 
are in the legal contract, then the only basis for not going ahead is that we don’t 
believe that the government is credible when it signs an internationally-binding 
agreement.’” He implied that the Bank could not take such a position. He went on 
to say that “We have all the leverage of suspension. If Brazil does not meet the 
covenants, we can suspend.” A guffaw greeted this remark. Someone said, “Since 
when have we suspended? The threat is not credible.” Stern came in sharply. “I have 
agreed to suspensions every time they have been recommended by the regions, 
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without exception.” He went on. “That’s the trouble with you guys. you are always 
trying to second guess me. you are not sending recommendations [for suspension] 
up. I am not the block.”22
The project proceeded to the phase of negotiations with the Brazilian govern-
ment. The negotiations, held at Bank headquarters, were unusually long and dif-
ficult, taking 10 working days. The two main sticking points were the Bank’s 
covenants on Amerindian protection, which the Brazilians regarded as an issue of 
national security that foreigners should not be involved in, and the Bank’s require-
ment for an independent monitoring and evaluation capacity, which the Brazilians 
thought an infringement of government prerogatives. 
With negotiations complete, the phase I project went for Board approval in 
december 1981. At the Board meeting the staff from the Latin America region gave 
a glowing account. As well as the many benefits that would flow from the re-
moval of infrastructural bottlenecks, they said, the project included “specific envi-
ronmental protection measures, including an ecological research component de-
signed to help monitor the impact of developmental activities on the natural 
environment.” In addition “the health project would support efforts to control 
malaria and to improve basic health infrastructure in Rondonia. In conjunction 
with these projects, the government was carrying out a special project to safeguard 
the health and lands of the region’s Amerindian population....” Then they gave a 
brief caution: “despite the mitigating efforts included in the projects, the effort to 
attempt to guide a spontaneous movement already under way carried many risks 
[left unspecified]. However, the risks were considerably lower than those which 
would have existed in the absence of the program [left unspecified] ” 
The Board resoundingly endorsed the project. Several Board representatives 
complemented the Bank and the Brazilian government for the excellence of the 
conception and design. They pointed to the “truly integrated nature and the com-
prehensive approach to development” demonstrated in the project; and “cited the 
balance among infrastructure, agriculture, health and even ecology and Amerindian 
welfare”. Said one, “the strategy for harmonious development of the region and 
opening it to productive settlement was a bold attempt which deserved admiration 
and substantial external support.” 
Only one speaker raised worries about the core of the project. “[H]e stressed 
the risk that if the project were not successful, it could harm the image of the Bank. 
... He stressed the necessity of the Bank monitoring the project closely, with peri-
odic progress reports to the Board.” Another speaker seconded his remarks. The 
staff assured them that monitoring and evaluation had been built in.23 
22 As recalled by Stern’s assistant, Jane Pratt, interview, March 15, 1995. 
23 Board minutes, dated december 15, 1981, “Loans to Brazil for integrated development of the 
northwest region”, meeting of december 1, 1981, emphases added.
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Unmentioned were the questions raised at the working levels about the basic 
economic viability of the project, the potential for agriculture in the region, alterna-
tive investment sequences, alternative transport modes, alternative regions for ag-
ricultural development, and implementation capacity of the federal and state agen-
cies in the region. 
Polonoroeste set sail on a raft of assumptions as brittle as they were heroic, or 
expedient. 
Part II of this paper will be published in vol. 36 nº 3 (144), July-September/2016.
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